Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to address the following questions. How has support among Russians for democratic values and institutions changed since 1990? Does such support depend on short-term calculations of economic and governmental performance or does it exist independently of such calculations? And finally, what are the implications of answers to these questions for the prospects for democracy in Russia?
The significance of the first question has become especially relevant since the transfer of presidential power from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin on 1 January 2000. From the beginning of the democratic experiment in Russia in 1990, Russians were led by Boris Yeltsin, the first popularly elected Russian president. Despite Yeltsin's public commitment to the building of democratic institutions, the system he left to his successor was at best a "delegative" democracy in which an elected chief executive exercised power largely without institutional constraints (O'Donnell, 1994) . 2 Most assessments of Yeltin's impact on democratization and support for democratic values among Russians are quite negative (Huskey, 2001; Shevtsova, 1999) . As Archie Brown (Brown, 2003, p.24) writes of this period: "one is forced to conclude that the experience of the 1990s did little to reinforce that strand in Russian political culture supportive of democratic principles."
Since 2000, Russia has been led by Yeltsin's chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, also popularly elected. Assessments of his successor's commitment to democracy, however, have been even gloomier. One observer (Herspring, 2005, p.295 ) concludes flatly, "Putin is clearly more authoritarian than Yeltsin was." Another (Daniels, 2000) calls it a "democratic dictatorship." Harley Balzer has coined the term "managed pluralism" to describe the Putin administration, but he makes it clear (p.220) that this does not correspond to democracy. These views are widely shared by others, some of whom suggest that the return to authoritarian rule is a natural fit with traditional Russian political culture. 3 The conclusion of Putin's first term in office and his re-election to a second term in March 2004 would seem, therefore, to be an opportune time to revisit the question of how public support for democratic values has changed since the democratic experiment in Russia began.
Beyond the important substantive question of whether there is public support for democracy among Russians, a comparison of the political attitudes, values and beliefs held by
Russians today with those held in the 1990s provides a sort of natural laboratory for testing theories of political culture. In particular, it may enable us to compare alternate paradigms for understanding post-Communist politics, notably those offered by institutional and rational choice perspectives. These perspectives would suggest that popular support for democracy is a function of how well institutions of government perform economically and politically.
Put another way, people will prefer a democratic system to a more authoritarian one if they perceive that they are better off than they were. Because such calculations are essentially instrumental, popular support for democracy can change fairly quickly in response to relatively short term policy changes. In this view, any long standing normative commitments Russians may, or may not, have about democracy (the "culturalist" explanation) are essentially irrelevant to democratization in Russia because they are not particularly useful in explaining support for democracy.
This paper offers tentative answers to these questions, both substantive and theoretical, on the basis of longitudinal research carried out by the author in Yaroslavl', Russia from 1990 through 2004. Much of the research was qualitative involving an average of one trip a year for observation and personal interviews. But, it was also quantitative. A fully representative opinion survey conducted in 1990 was replicated in 1993, 1996 and most recently, in 2004 . While caution must be exercised about generalizing from a single case, the advantage of this study is that it was conducted with a relatively homogenous population, one not dissimilar to other ethnically Russian areas of Western Russia. Furthermore it is a unique data set in that is enables us to compare political attitudes and beliefs held by Russians at the very beginning of the democratic experiment with those held today.
Literature Review
The prevailing view of Russian political culture before Western social scientists were able to conduct independent survey research in Russia starting in 1989 was that it bore the hallmarks of Russia's authoritarian past. Much of what we thought we knew was based on an analysis of Russian history. The authoritarian traditions of pre-revolutionary Russia had not been changed by Soviet rule, the argument went; rather they were reinforced, suggesting that a continuity of political thinking by Russians made them predisposed to accept authoritarian political institutions. (A discussion of this historical understanding is made by Alexander
Lukin.) 4 Two pioneers in the study of political culture in Communist societies shared this view in varying degrees. Stephen White was the first to write a book (White, 1979) exclusively on the question of political culture in the Soviet Union. White made it clear that in his view, Bolshevik leadership did not mark a radical departure from the autocratic political culture prevailing in preRevolutionary Russia. On the contrary, the political culture of the Soviet Union represented continuity with that inheritance. In a later publication (White, 1984) , he even more strongly articulated this point of view and suggested that political scientists should "take the historical cure" and acknowledge a "degree of causal weight" to political culture in understanding the distinctiveness of Soviet politics. If this "cultural continuity" thesis proved accurate, prospects for successful democratization in Russia would appear slight. Such a political culture would likely prove to be incompatible with democratic institutions.
The other pioneer in the study of political culture in Communist countries is Archie speaking, these findings were independently confirmed in a number of other studies (Gibson, et al., 1992; Reisinger et al., 1994; Gibson, 1996) based on survey research conducted in the early 1990s.
The results of these early studies came under increasingly critical scrutiny both substantively and methodologically in the mid and late 1990s. Substantively, new research became available which showed that the early optimism about Russian support for democracy may have been premature, an artifact of early enthusiasm for reform. As Archie Brown has pointed out (Brown, 2003, p. 21) , 1990-91 were years of excitement and high expectations among Russians, but "a decade later there was much more disillusionment". My own research, replicated in Yaroslavl' in 1993 and 1996, led me to conclude (Hahn, 2001, p.106 (Gibson, 2001) indicate that Russians' perceptions of economic performance have had little impact on support for political democracy although they have had more of an effect on support for market reforms.
He also found that attitudes were little changed from the late 1990's. Gibson concludes (p.123) that: "The overwhelming conclusion of this research is that the nascent democratic culture in 
Concepts/Hypotheses
Since the introduction of the term into the political science literature in the nineteen fifties, few concepts have engendered more controversy and criticism than political culture. This is not the place to review the history of the concept, which in any case has been done by others, notably Archie Brown (Brown, 1996; Brown, 2003) . Given the controversy, however, it is incumbent on the author of a chapter dealing with political culture to make clear where he stands on at least some of the issues. At a minimum, we need to answer the following questions. What do we mean by the term? Does our definition include behavior? How do we distinguish between opinion and political culture? Why do we think the concept matters? And, finally, what measurements are appropriate for its study? Because the author has addressed these questions at some length elsewhere (Hahn, 2001, p.76-79) , what follows is a summary of his positions. The issues of measurement are discussed in the section on research design below.
Following Almond (1990) , Brown and Gray (1977) intergenerational transfer known as the process of political socialization. As a result, while political cultures can and do change, they do so only slowly over time.
The significance of political culture is independent of its ability to explain political behavior, although the two may be related. This author agrees with Brown (1984) in excluding behavior from the definition of political culture. However, as he notes (p.150), "To define political culture in such a way as to exclude behavior in no way implies a lack of interest in behavior". Nor does excluding behavior from the definition of political culture preclude finding correlations between them. In a similar vein, one must be cautious about assuming that political outcomes are directly linked to, or explained by, political culture. One of the problems with the 'continuity thesis' referred to earlier is that it conveys a certain determinism with respect to political change in Russia, (e.g., Russian political culture is so historically freighted with authoritarianism that democratic outcomes are precluded). Instead, this author shares the view that institutional outcomes and political culture are mutually dependent and that the causal arrow can go either way. While political culture may condition political outcomes and institutions, it is equally clear that political institutions can and do shape political cultures.
The preceding review of the literature suggests several tentative answers to the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter. One is that if Russia under Putin is indeed backsliding into an authoritarian regime is more congruent with that said to be characteristic of Russian political culture, then we would expect to find that whatever support there was for democratic values and institutions as measured by the variables of diffuse support (efficacy, trust, civic duty, interest, and support for a multi-party system) to have declined.
Specifically, for the study at hand, given the erosion of support found between 1990 and 1996 (Hahn, 2001 , p.106) we would expect to find further erosion of such values since 1996.
Similarly, we would expect to find an increase in support for variables related to a strong state system and authoritarian leadership. Alternatively, however, if we find little change in these measures, especially those that measure values and not merely attitudes, 7 then we may tentatively conclude that there at some level is a normative commitment to democracy even though Russians don't believe they live in one. Strong support for Putin would not be inconsistent with such a conclusion, but it may imply that such support is conditional.
The second question asked at the outset sought to explain any variance in the values and attitudes measured here as a function of short-term calculations of economic benefits. Following from the rational choice (or instrumental) perspectives reviewed previously, we would expect to find any changes in support for democratic values and institutions can be explained by short-term situational factors related to evaluations of economic and political performance. Specifically for our study, we would expect that assessments of economic well being, both socio-tropic (societal) and egocentric (personal), would explain most of the variation in political attitudes, as well their assessment of political reforms. Put another way, for respondents whose perceptions of economic and political performance since 1996 have been negative, attachment to democratic values and institutions will have declined more than for those whose situation improved since 1996.
Research Design
To explore these issues further, survey data from a longitudinal study of public opinion sampling was based on an initial quota sample using age and gender in proportion to the population. Electoral districts down to the precinct level were then chosen on a randomized basis and apartments were chosen randomly on a skip interval basis. Interviews were conducted only when respondents matched the assigned quotas for age and gender.
As a result of the change in sampling procedures, the response rate in 2004 was higher.
Of 1217 surveys turned in, 85 had to be discarded, leaving a net total sample of 1132. Interviews In this research, we look primarily at sources of diffuse support (Easton, p. 273 Finally, there are a number of variables aimed at measuring orientations more specifically related to political and economic reforms. Some of these were also combined into additive scales. Independent variables used in this analysis include measures of how respondents evaluate the government's economic performance, both socio-tropically and egocentrically, and prospectively and retrospectively. Due to limits of space, the effects of socio-economic status variables (education, income, occupation), as well as standard demographic variables, including age, gender and place of birth cannot be included here, but will be examined in future analyses.
An additive scale was created measuring respondents' overall evaluation of economic performance.
The first section of the data analysis presents a comparison of the frequency distributions for responses to the same questions at four points in time (1990, 1993, 1996 and 2004) for each of our dependent variables. These give some indication of whether there has been any erosion over time of diffuse support associated with democratic systems. The second section explores the question of whether variance in our dependent variables is a function of how well institutions of government have performed economically. To do this, in cases where more than one item of measurement was used, additive scales were constructed to provide summary measures of the dependent variables. They are then cross-tabulated with the independent variables. Specifically, we want to know if respondents who feel that the economic life has gotten worse, societally and personally, also less likely to support democratic values. We will compare the relationship between these variables for 1996 and 2004.
As noted earlier there have been a number of criticisms about using survey research to assess the depth of the Russian commitment to democracy (Welch, 1993; Alexander, 1997) . One of these is the argument that survey research fails to get at the deeper meanings of culture that might be revealed by anthropological methods. Another criticism (Brown, 2003, p.20) is that survey research is more appropriate to studying attitudes in stable societies; the Russian transition has been too rapid and turbulent to allow for more than transitory conclusions. And there is the argument (Bahry, 1999 ) that close-ended questions with forced choices do not enable the researcher to get at the differences that may be embedded within different layers of the respondents; poorly framed questions may miss these nuances. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a grudging consensus that, as Stephen White puts it (White, 2002, p.36) : "With all its limitations, it is survey research that can most readily answer questions of this kind."
One technique which may help to get at the deeper meanings and ambiguities that underlie responses to a survey questionnaire is the use of focus groups. As Richard Kruger Political efficacy measures the degree to which people feel subjectively that they can exercise control over the decisions by government that affect their lives. The concept was originally developed by Angus Campbell and his colleagues (1954) whose now classic study of American voting behaviour sought to explain why people voted or abstained. Many of the questions used by the authors to measure political efficacy were used in this study in order to provide a basis for comparison. 12 The argument that subjective competence was central to a 'civic' or participant political culture was also made by Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture (1963) . More recent analyses have emphasized the distinction between feelings of internal and external efficacy. The former indicates an individual's perception of his or her own ability to understand political life, while the later indicates whether they feel the government is actually responsive to their input (see discussion in Karaman, 2004) . Questions one, two, four and five in Table 1 were used to measure external efficacy while questions three and six measure internal efficacy. Questions one to four in Table 1 (Brown, 2003, p.21 ) that early surveys of opinion were excessively optimistic reflecting the enthusiasm of the time. But from 1993 on feelings regarding efficacy remain little changed or decline.
However, there is one noteworthy exception to this generalisation. Responses to measures of internal efficacy (questions three and six) show a steady increase from 1993.
Moreover, the figures for internal efficacy are generally higher than for external efficacy (questions one, two, four and five) and. In both 1996 and 2004, they are higher by a difference of 15 to 21 percent. It appears that although government is not perceived as being very responsive to citizen input, at least in some cases it is not because people lack a sense of subjective competence. Moreover, although the level of powerlessness is high both nationally and locally, the data suggest that local government may be perceived as a bit more responsive than the national one. As the data in Table 1 indicate, while levels of efficacy declined from 1990 to 2004 on the national level, they did not do so at the local level. Nevertheless, regarding local government, in 2004 when we asked whether the respondents thought they could do anything if the city council made a decision they felt was wrong, 14 65 percent said there would be "nothing" they could do, almost identical with the figure of 66 percent from 1996. Only eight percent indicated that they had ever tried to influence local decisions, up slightly from six percent in 1996. It is interesting to note that although most of our respondents thought there was little they could do to have an effect on an unjust decision by their local government, when asked if they felt it is necessary for the voters to have more means of influence on the decisions of the city government than they have now, 68 percent thought there should be.
POLITICAL TRUST
Political trust is an evaluative orientation towards government based on how well government meets normative commitments. Low levels of political trust are associated with political cynicism (Campbell, 1979, pp.87-95) . Although most scholars would agree that political trust is essential to the functioning of democracy, there is disagreement about whether it is a source of specific or diffuse support (Heatherington, 1998, p.792) . Those who argue the former position maintain that a decline in political trust reflects public judgment of the incumbent government's performance and can be changed by an improvement in that performance. Others maintain that political trust is a source of diffuse support because it is related to the public perception of regime legitimacy. Again, for the sake of comparison, the measures of political trust used in Table 2 are similar to those that have been used to measure political trust in the United States.
The data reported here suggest several points of interest. Overall, levels of political trust among our respondents are higher than levels of political efficacy. Why people might trust a government they feel they cannot influence is a question we shall turn to later. There are some important differences that emerge when one looks at trust of national and local governments. There are some other data from the survey which shed light on the question of political trust among our respondents but which are not reported in Table 1 . In some ways, these data appear contradictory. On the one hand, our respondents perceive widespread corruption among those in government. 55 percent thought that "all or almost officials (dolzhnostnykh lits) all" take bribes while 25 percent thought it was only about half of them; 58 percent thought "all or almost all officials" showed favoritism to friends and connections with another 22 percent saying this was true for half. Dispiritingly, the numbers for both of these questions rose over those for 1996. On the other hand, it seems clear that political trust in executives is higher than for those in the legislative branch. This is especially true for President Putin who is much more trusted than his predecessor. In 2004, 78 percent said they trusted their current president somewhat or completely, compared with 22 percent saying the same for Yeltsin in 1996. The data also suggest that the mayor of Yaroslavl' is more trusted than city council members. It may also be significant that while very few respondents could name their representative to their legislatures, or the heads of the legislatures, over 95 percent could name the mayor and the governor of Yaroslavl'.
ELECTIONS AND VOTING
Electoral competition is perhaps universally regarded as the most central requirement for a democracy. Starting with the parliamentary and local elections held in March 1990, Russian elections have been competitive, though not necessarily always free and fair (Brown, 2001, p.554-556) . One measure of public attitudes towards electoral participation is their sense of citizen, or civic, duty. Students of American voting behavior early on concluded that this attitude was a result of childhood socialization and that it was strongly correlated with voter turnout. As one author (Campbell, p.239 ) puts it, "Without a sense of citizen duty, very few people bother to vote; no other attitude can make up for this lack". The present study uses the questions developed by Angus Campbell and his colleagues at the University of Michigan to look at levels of civic duty among our respondents. Like other studies (Colton and McFaul, p.103; White, 2002, p.45) , the data indicate widespread support for the idea that voting is important. Generally speaking, this is true for all four of our surveys. However, it is interesting to note that the sense of civic duty among our respondents was stronger in 2004 than in 1996 and is closer to the figures for 1990 which was, arguably, a year when the novelty of competitive elections might have been expected to produce unusually high enthusiasm. Why? One answer may be that popular trust in political institutions, or at least in some political personalities, also rose. We have already noted the greater trust in
Putin and the mayor of Yaroslavl', but there are data to suggest that this approval also extends to 'Unified Russia', the political party which the public associates with support for Putin, and to the State Duma itself, though nowhere near as strongly. Table 3 ). Combined with the earlier finding of greater political efficacy at the local level, it may be that people feel voting matters more locally.
OTHER INDICATORS: POLITICAL AWARENESS; A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM
There are two other indicators related to popular support for democratic values and institutions for which the author has gathered replicate data over four surveys. These relate to political awareness and support for a multi-party system. Political awareness has long been identified as necessary for a functioning democracy. Almond and Verba (1963) argued that those living in participant or civic culture would characteristically be more aware of, and informed about, politics.
More recently, Tatyana Karaman (2004) There is a substantial body of literature establishing the important place that competitive political parties hold in both sustaining and consolidating democracy. 18 Parties help voters structure their choices in meaningful ways, act to aggregate the public interest, recruit people into political participation and they can act as a source of accountability for those in power.
Despite the obvious value of political parties to democracy, parties in Russia remain weakly institutionalised, explained in part, perhaps, by the weakness of Russia's civil society (Sakwa, 2001, p.106 ).
The data from our surveys suggest a disconnection between multi-party politics as an abstract concept and the way people actually feel about political parties. When asked if they felt the country needs a multi-party system, 58 percent of our respondents in 2004 said it did, up a few points from 1996 (54 percent) and 1990 when it was 52 percent. About a quarter of the respondents replied in the negative for each year. Yet, when asked which party they had confidence in, 30 percent replied "no party" with 40 percent supporting the current party of power, Unified Russia. All others received less than 10 percent.
Before turning to the next section of this chapter, there are certain seeming anomalies in the preceding findings that merit attention. For one, our data indicate very low levels of political efficacy among our respondents, especially regarding the national government. Yet, levels of political trust are significantly higher. As we asked earlier: why would people place trust in a government they feel they cannot influence? Furthermore, following Stephen White's analysis cited earlier, how do we explain the finding there is broad support among Russians for electoral participation, when people don't feel voting matters much? Finally, why do respondents think political parties are such a good idea in the abstract, yet express indifference to them in practice?
Because the questions used in our survey analysis don't readily address these questions, we turned to the results of our focus group interviews to try to understand what lay beneath the data.
The prompts we used in each two hour session were designed to determine what respondents understood democracy to mean (cognitive), whether they thought such a system desirable (affective), whether they thought Russia had a democracy (evaluative) and how they would explain any discrepancy between the ideal of democracy and what they thought Russia is.
For all four of our focus groups, although in varying degrees, there was a fairly high level of cognition. People thought that democracy was about more than elections, but also about civil rights, equality of opportunity, a rule of law, and public accountability for those in office. Most also held the view that democracy was their preferred system of government, but they almost all also felt that Russia was not one. As one pensioner said, "Russia is about 30 percent a democracy; the rest is authoritarian."
Beyond these generalizations there are some important nuances, and some important generational differences. What emerges from our respondents, especially the older ones, is the view that democracy indeed requires political trust, but trust means that a good government (gosudarstvo) will take care of its citizens. At the same time, they seem to be saying that what such a government does not necessarily require is public input. It is a view of government that comes closer to the idea of trusteeship representation (Pitkin, than to an "instructed delegate" or mandate model. In a trusteeship model those elected exercise their best judgement about what to do on behalf their constituents independently of whether their constituents agree.
The following exchange between a young woman aged 21-25 and a pensioner over fifty captures this view and the generational differences:
Moderator: "How do you imagine democracy?" Younger girl: "For me, democracy is not only being equal before the law, but also about participating in making laws. It's also knowing your responsibilities and therefore knowing your rights." Pensioner:
"The girl talks about participating, rights and everything -that's wonderful, but imagine you work all day; do I really want to participate in politics? No!" Girl:
"But you do participate when you're voting, don't you?" Pensioner:
"Elections are a separate conversation. We don't have real elections…" Girl:
"But you have to trust your representatives." Pensioner:
"I don't have to trust anyone. When I can just live peacefully and let them make decisions at the top, that's when it's democracy." Girl:
"But that just develops a passive citizen who doesn't care what's going on." Pensioner:
"Democracy is just a term. In reality it's responsibility from the top (gosudarstvo), responsibility for me, and my children and for every person. From my side, it means trust in the officials, government bodies, and members of the soviet [sic!]. Democracy is not done through the Duma or what we have now. It's done through one person. It's not dictatorship though, it's democracy. My trust, I trust them -there is nothing for me to do in the government."
In the middle age group which consisted of eight women and two men between the age of 30 and 50, all possessing higher education, the same sense of government as trustee of the public good was expressed. One of the participants was a woman named Lena who explained that "we can't have democratic elections in Russia because people don't know who they are electing" and that people aren't really equal anyway. Her view of government comes close to paternalism.
Moderator: "So, Lena, to describe your position better, democracy as a form of equal rights doesn't exist?" Lena:
"We can't have 50,000 people governing. We have to have a government for the people, a national government (narodnaya vlast'). Democracy is for everyone; it brings people closer to it. It's just like a parent deciding which child needs what and giving them that. That's how a democracy is, giving everyone what they need."
Variations on this theme reappear throughout the interviews. For most, the answer to the question about how people can trust a government that they are powerless to influence is not a contradiction; a government that performs well is worthy of trust. As we will show below, the one political variable clearly linked to governmental performance is political trust. Only for the younger generation aged 21 to 25 who came of age after the Soviet Union collapsed, is there a sense that they can participate (internal efficacy) and should.
The focus group responses also hint at an answer to why support for elections and for a multiparty system might be fairly strong in our survey responses, yet respondents don't feel they can influence government and don't identify with political parties. The participants on our focus groups demonstrate a pretty good grasp of how democracies work ideally, but they also know that what they are living in falls far short of the ideal.
Therefore, one can endorse the need for elections and even a multi-party system as necessary in a democracy, and yet not see them as functioning very meaningfully in Russia under current conditions. From this point of view, support for a strong leader is not inconsistent with democracy; on the contrary, it is the strong leader who makes things work well that deserves public trust. As Resinger et al., (1994) caution, a response from Russians indicating support for a strong leader does not necessarily mean they want an authoritarian regime. As the authors write (p.215) about their Russian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian respondents "those desiring strong leadership were not expressing a wish for arbitrary or harmful leadership. Rather they were expressing a desire for 'good government' by means of finding the proper leaders and letting them govern". This brings us to the next set of findings from this research: the significance of economic performance to support for democratic values and institutions.
B. Does Economic Performance Explain Political Attitudes?
We turn now to consider findings related to the second question that guided this research.
To what extent do the measures of political support for democratic values and institutions used in this research reflect instrumental calculations of whether governmental performance has been effective or not? Following from the perspectives of rational choice theory, we hypothesised that those whose assessment of economic performance was negative would be less likely to hold attitudes favourable to democracy and also to be less supportive of political and economic reforms associated with building democracy in Russia.
To test this hypothesis, we first used responses to four questions measuring the respondent's assessment of economic performance. These measures are found in Table 4 . The first two items are socio-tropic, and were asked both retrospectively and prospectively. The fourth item is egocentric and retrospective for three years, while the third item specifically asks what the government's economic role was over the previous year. Items three and four were both retrospective. Each item was correlated separately with the attitudes, values and beliefs related to diffuse support for democracy explored in the first section of this paper. An additive scale was created from the four items measuring perceptions of economic performance and was also correlated with the political variables.
Perhaps the clearest finding that emerges from this table is that the political variable most strongly correlated with economic assessments is political trust. This is true for all four of our independent variables. In almost all cases the correlation is greater than .20 and for the overall scale it is a robust .41. For most of the political variables other than political trust, the correlation with economic assessments is weak or not significant (n.s. n.s.
-.14 n.s. 1-4) n.s. n.s.
Scaled economic assessment (items
-.14 -.10 * Pearson's R correlations were used in all cases. Only correlations significant at the .05 level are reported. Correlations are between negative assessment of economic performance and the political and economic variables in the direction indicated for each.
The other interesting finding that is also supported by Table 4 has to do with the differences between 1996 and 2004. With two minor exceptions, all the correlations for 2004 are lower than for 1996. 20 What that seems to tell us is that assessments of the economic situation were more important for how respondents felt politically in 1996. The explanation for this difference may lie in the fact that Russia was better off economically in 2004 than in 1996, a year of continuing economic dislocation for many and so economic issues were less salient for them. This interpretation would appear to be supported by other data from the survey that indicate that people were feeling better about the economy in 2004. Thus, in 1996, 44 percent rated the "provision of goods and products to population" to be an acute problem; by 2004, only 11 percent did while 58 percent responded that there was no problem. Another explanation may be that Putin is regarded so much more favorably as a leader than Yeltsin was.
The data from our survey also enable us to offer another look at the importance of economic assessments in explaining political attitudes. Table 5 and 6 summarize responses to a series of questions designed to find out how our respondents feel about the political and economic reforms often associated with building democracy in Russia. Table 5 presents responses to two sets of three questions related to political attitudes. One is intended to measure support for popular participation in politics, and the other, preferences for a strong leader. The first three questions were chosen to see if Russians trust public participation in decision making while the latter three go to the issue of whether Russians really prefer a more authoritarian form of leadership. Summary scale (mean score)* x=2.07 x=2.20 x=2.12 * The range for the summary scales is 1.00-3.00. The lower the mean score the greater the support for the variable. Scale reliability tests were performed and all scales exceeded the minimum mean inter-item correlation Correlation of .088. * The range for summary scales is l.00-3.00. The lower the mean score the greater the support for the variable. Scale reliability tests were performed and all scales exceeded the mean inter-item correlation of .088.
On the question of popular participation, there seems to be some support for having the opportunity to do so, even though about 60 percent feel that some decisions are beyond their competence, a finding similar to the one reported earlier for internal efficacy. On the question of a strong leader, the data here confirm findings by other scholars (Reisinger, et al., 1994 ) that
Russians prefer a 'strong hand', although as noted earlier they go on to argue ( p.189) such an attitude in not necessarily inconsistent with democratic leanings. About three quarters of our population seem to favor a rule of men over a rule of laws. Table 6 looks at economic attitudes. The first three questions are aimed at measuring resentment of those who acquire more than their neighbor, a view that Russian folklore holds to be traditional. Yet, while it seems clear that our respondents feel that wealthy people should pay more than the poor, only about half think there should be a limit on how much one can accumulate. The second set of five questions, measure people's attitudes toward a free market economy. The response to the benefits of a market economy are mixed, but on the whole favorable; most think the private sector should be expanded and that state regulation of the economy "does more harm than good." What is quite remarkable about the data reported here is the relative consistency for all four measures in tables 5 and 6 over time. There are no dramatic swings of opinion between 1993, 1996 and 2004. 21 Each of the four sets of questions from table 5 and 6 was used to create four additive scales that became our dependent variables in Table 7 . Table 7 reports the findings when these variables were correlated with the independent variables measuring assessments of economic performance used in Table 4 . There are two significant findings that emerge from this table.
First, it seems clear that assessments of economic performance have little or nothing to do with the political preferences of our respondents, but they do appear to be related to how they feel about economic reforms. This finding would seem to be consistent with the conclusion offered by James Gibson (Gibson, 2001, p.123) Such a finding would appear consistent with the one reported earlier from Table 3 . Correlations are between negative assessment of economic performance and the political and economic variables in the direction indicated for each.
Conclusions
The major purpose of this chapter was to determine how much change had taken place in support for political attitudes, values and beliefs associated with democracy since serious survey research into the democratic experiment in Russia began in 1990. More particularly, we wanted to see if there had been any significant change from the Yeltsin years after his successor's first term in office. As noted earlier, the findings offered here are based on replicable survey research conducted among the predominantly ethnically Russian population of Yaroslavl ' in 1990, 1993, 1996 and 2004 . Focus group interviews conducted in 2004 were also used to help understand some of the anomalous findings that emerged from the survey data.
Our general finding is that there has been relatively little change in political attitudes, values and beliefs of our respondents since 1993. Because earlier analyses of these data (Hahn, 2001) showed an erosion of support for these variables, especially from 1990 to 1993, our expectation was that further erosion would be likely. Yet the comparison of data from 1996 to 2004 does not suggest that any such erosion. On the contrary, there was, if anything, an upswing of support for most variables, including, political trust, civic duty, political interest and cognition, and support for a multi-party system. Levels of political efficacy remained low, but improved after 1993 for some measures of subjective competence. Only political interest showed a modest decline in this period. Moreover, the attitudes related to political and economic reform examined in Tables 5 and 6 similarly show little change from 1996 to 2004. 22 Among the measures used, it is important to reiterate that political trust as a variable seems to be an attitude responsive to government policies of the day and subject to short term fluctuation, not an enduring value which can be associated with support for democracy as the other variables seem to be.
The other major finding here is that short-term assessments of government performance explain some, but by no means all, of the variance in our political variables, offering only partial support for our second hypothesis. Of the political attitudes, values, and beliefs discussed in the first section of this chapter, only political trust clearly seems to be related to perceptions of how well the government is performing economically. The other variables were at most weakly related to such perceptions. Thus, this variable at least would appear to be a specific and contingent source of support. Finally, one finding regarding the importance of perceived economic performance that clearly emerges from our analysis is that such assessments appear to have a definite impact on how people feel about economic changes, but not about political ones.
This would appear to confirm the findings of James Gibson (2001) Why? The most straightforward explanation for this apparent contradiction is that most people feel better off than they did under Yeltsin; that is, for many, government has become more effective. Yet, it would clearly be a mistake to conflate support for governmental performance with support for democracy, although they are also certainly not necessarily contradictory; those living is democratic societies would surely value both. It would also certainly be wrong to equate support for Putin with support for democracy. However, it would also be a mistake to conclude that Putin necessarily signifies a reversion to authoritarianism among Russians. If it did we would have found evidence of a change in that direction among our respondents and we did not. In short, Putin may well continue to implement undemocratic policies, but it seems from the findings presented here that he should not assume that there is a strongly authoritarian Russian political culture that will indefinitely support them.
